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ABSTRACT 
 
In secret sharing scheme, the master secret and all the private shares (which are 
distributed by the dealer to the shareholders) are the two secrets which are to be maintained 
confidentially. In all the secret sharing schemes proposed till date, private shares are reused to 
reconstruct the master secret. But we proposed a new way of Proactive Secret Sharing Scheme in 
which, instead of renewing the private shares frequently at the beginning of each timeslot during 
the share renewal process, each time master secret is renewed. In this way private shares can be 
reused for a longer period of time and to construct different master secrets. In addition, after each 
renewing process, shareholders can work together to verify that their private shares are consistent 
without revealing private shares.  We also proposed protocols to generate and renew master 
secret, authenticate public shares of the master secret, add or revoke shares and change threshold 
of the master secret. Thus an enhancement to Proactive Secret Sharing is proposed in this thesis 
and this unique feature simples the implementation of PSS as the change is to be made only to 
the master secret (central server) without effecting all private shares. 
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                CHAPTER 1   
           INTRODUCTION 
Secret sharing schemes protect the secrecy and integrity of information by distributing 
the information over different locations. The (t, n) threshold secret sharing schemes were 
introduced by Shamir [29] and Blakley [6] independently in 1979 for protecting the 
cryptographic keys. In a (t , n) threshold secret sharing scheme, a secret s is divided into n shares 
by a dealer D, and is distributed among n shareholders P = {P1,P2……Pn} in such a way that at 
least t shares from the shareholders are required to reconstruct the secret. Shamir’s (t, n) secret 
sharing scheme is information theoretically secure; as fewer than t shares can gain no 
information about the secret.  
In Shamir’s (t, n) threshold scheme, a dealer generates n shares based on a (t - 1)th degree 
polynomial. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme assumes that the dealer who divides the secret and 
distributes shares to shareholders without making any mistake. Secret reconstruction is based on 
Lagrange interpolating polynomial of any t private shares. Since secret sharing was proposed 
initially by Shamir [29] and Blakley [6], research on this topic has been extensive. In the 
“classic” secret sharing schemes, there are assumed to be no faults in the system. 
If the length of any share is equal to the length of the secret, then that secret sharing 
scheme is called ideal. If any unauthorized subset of shares provide absolutely no information 
about the secret in the information-theoretic sense, then the scheme is said to be perfect. Shamir 
proposed the first (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme which is both ideal and perfect. 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is based on Lagrange interpolating polynomial and is 
information-theoritic secure (unconditionally secure). All shareholders who receive their shares 
from the dealer must unconditionally trust that the shares they received are valid. In 1985, Chor 
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et al [12] introduced a new notion called verifiable secret sharing (VSS) to the original secret 
sharing scheme. Using the verifiable property, all the shareholders can verify the consistency of 
their shares. Even if the dealer is malicious, VSS ensures that there is a well-defined secret which 
the shareholders can later reconstruct. 
Later, Benaloh [2] developed an interactive VSS based on Shamir's scheme. Feldman 
[17] and Pedersen [26] developed non-interactive VSS using different commitment schemes. 
Feldman’s scheme protects the secrecy of the secret in a computational sense while Pedersen’s 
scheme protects the secrecy of the scheme in information-theoritic sense. After analyzing both 
Benaloh's VSS [2] and Pedersen's VSS [26] ,  Lin et al. [21]  in his very recent publication stated 
that all shares in both schemes are t-consistent, but shares may still violate the security 
requirements of a secret sharing scheme( i.e., at least t or more than t shares are required to 
reconstruct the secret). So they presented a notion of strong VSS. A strong VSS scheme can 
ensure that: 
 (1). All shares are t-consistent, and  
(2). All shares satisfy the security requirements of a secret sharing scheme. 
The protection provided by the Secret sharing schemes is insufficient as the secret is 
stored for a long period of time. In many applications, secret needs to be stored for a long period 
of time. Intuitively, the secret can be protected by multiple shareholders using the secret sharing 
scheme. Given sufficient time, adversary can attack the shareholders to obtain the secret. We can 
overcome this limitation using Proactive secret sharing in which shares are refreshed periodically 
without compromising the secrecy of the shares. Ostrovsky and Yung [25] presented the notion 
of proactive security which refers to security and availability against the mobile adversary. 
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Herzberg et al. [19] proposed the first proactive secret sharing (PSS) scheme against the mobile 
adversary. 
The main properties of Proactive secret sharing are: 
• Shares are renewed frequently without compromising the secret to obtain new shares, so 
that even if the old shares are exposed, the adversary can know nothing about the secret. 
• Lost or corrupted shares can be recovered without compromising the secrecy of the 
 shares. 
1.1 Proactive Secret Sharing 
In proactive secret sharing, time is divided into multiple slots and shares are renewed at 
the beginning of each time slot; the new shares are completely different from the old shares. The 
secret is secure and is protected under the assumption that within each time slot the adversary 
can attack at most t-1 shares. PSS uses Share generation protocol for the generation of new 
shares and old shares can be discarded, rendering useless information with the collection of 
fewer than t shares by the adversary. PSS uses Share recovery protocol to generate new shared if 
some of the old shares have been lost or corrupted. The share renewal protocol in proactive 
secret sharing relies on verifiable secret sharing (VSS) which allows shareholders to verify 
consistency of renewed shares. 
Proactive secret sharing scheme based on Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS), provides 
strong security for a secret sharing against the active attacker.  It combines the secret sharing 
scheme with a periodical share update process to ensure the overall security of a system.  
Through update mechanism, old shares become useless.  Even to steal a secret; however, an 
attacker needs to intrude on at least t participants during the same time period if security is 
maintained in a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. 
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PSS imagine that servers are recovered at the rate at which they are compromised. A 
significant flaw in PSS is that “recovery” of servers that have been compromised or suffered 
irreparable hardware failures is problematic. Merely replacing the machine’s hardware or 
software might eliminate the fault, but it does not undo all of the damage; each machine’s 
identity on the network is defined by some secret state (e.g., private keys), and after a failure, this 
state might be deleted, corrupted, or known to the adversary. Consequently, the recovered server 
needs new secret state and in essence, a new identity, and we may as well consider it to be a new 
server. 
Ordinary PSS schemes ([25], [19], [9]) generate new shares of the shared secret, but they 
assume that other secret state associated with each server is never compromised, so the identities 
of the shareholders are fixed over the lifetime of the system. 
A better approach is to allow shareholders to be replaced with different nodes. This 
provides a reasonable methodology for a system administrator: identify a set of “fresh” nodes, 
e.g., recently added nodes or newly recovered nodes with new keys, and direct the secret shares 
to be moved to them. However, PSS schemes do not permit the replacement of one shareholder 
with another. Furthermore, a difficulty in defining such schemes is that a naive transfer of shares 
from an old group of servers to a new group may reveal the secret if more than t faulty servers 
exist between the old group and the new group. 
An additional point is that PSS schemes do not allow the threshold t to change, which 
may be desirable in a long-lived system. The threshold has a meaning: it represents an 
assumption about how easily nodes can become corrupted. If current events dictate a 
reevaluation of this assumption, it would be better to change to a new threshold rather than start 
over.  
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These schemes allow shareholders to determine whether the dealer sent them valid shares 
of the secret, hence allowing them to come to a consensus regarding whether the secret was 
shared successfully. In this context, the dealer is semi-trusted; it does not reveal the secret, but it 
might attempt to fool servers into accepting an invalid sharing of the secret. Verifiable secret 
sharing is an important component in many distributed secret sharing protocols involving un-
trusted participants because the protocols typically involve each server acting as a semi-trusted 
dealer to all of the others. 
Feldman’s [17] and Pedersen’s [26] schemes have similar efficiency but slightly different 
security guarantees. Feldman’s [17] scheme is perfectly binding (i.e., an un-trusted dealer cannot 
fool shareholders into accepting an invalid sharing) and computationally binding (meaning that 
secrecy is subject to computational hardness assumptions and the amount of computation 
available to the shareholders). Pedersen’s [26] scheme, on the other hand, is computationally 
binding and perfectly hiding. We focus on Feldman’s [17] scheme because it is notationally 
easier to describe than Pedersen’s [26] scheme; however, the systems we describe could be 
adapted to either scheme. 
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1.2 Contributions 
In secret sharing schemes, a secret s is divided into n shares by a dealer D and is 
distributed among n shareholders. In a long lived system, over a period of time there is chance 
that the adversary may attack the system by gaining the knowledge of at least t shares to recover 
the secret. Additionally, systems may fail to function properly, for instance due to hardware 
failure or an attack.  
Proactive secret sharing (PSS) schemes, address the problem that shares can be exposed 
or lost over time due to Byzantine faults. In PSS, servers execute a share regeneration (renewal) 
protocol, in which a new set of shares of the same secret is generated and the old shares are 
discarded, rendering useless any collection of t or fewer shares the adversary may have learned. 
Furthermore, PSS schemes typically provide a share recovery protocol so that a full set of new 
shares can be generated even if some of the old shares (up to some maximum number of faults 
tolerated) have been lost. 
 All the existing Proactive secret sharing schemes assume that an adversary can attack 
only the shares but not the master secret. Therefore, shares are renewed at the beginning of each 
time period. In our paper, we considered a complete different approach of Proactive secret 
sharing in which the master secret is to be renewed frequently but not the private shares. 
This thesis makes the following major contributions: 
• In the secret sharing scheme, the master secret s is determined by a mutually trusted 
dealer D and is stored in a centralized server. The dealer divides the secret into n shares 
and distributes it among n shareholders and the shares are stored separately in n 
distributed servers. In general PSS, it is believed that the adversary can attack only the 
shares but not the master secret. So the shares are renewed frequently at the beginning of 
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each time period. But we followed a completely different approach in which the master 
secret is to be renewed frequently without disturbing the private shares. 
• If once the shareholders are able to reconstruct the master secret, then the secret is no 
longer secure. So if all the shares are kept secure during the secret reconstruction, then 
the dealer needs to renew only the master secret. Using this proposal, PSS becomes even 
more efficient since the shares can be reused for long period of time. 
• The shares are distributed to the shareholders using a secure channel. We also considered 
the situation where a mobile adversary can successfully comprise some shareholders to 
know about the secret. 
• Without changing the private shares, the dealer can change the threshold of the master 
secret which provides an efficient way to change the threshold dynamically. 
• In most proactive secret sharing schemes, the access privilege of shares is controlled by 
the dealer.  Whenever old shares are compromised, the dealer need to revoke the 
compromised shares. Our approach allows dealer to add/revoke shares without re-
distributing remaining shares.  However, some changes to the master secret is to be 
performed.   
Our approach make the secret sharing even more practical and flexible. The private shares 
remain unchanged during the renewal of master secret and can be reused to construct several 
master secrets. One common feature in all of our proposed protocols is, to make changes only to 
the master secret without making any changes to the private shares. This unique feature 
simplifies the implementation of PSS since making changes to the master secret effects data 
stored in central server only. Our proposed scheme reduces the overhead in restoring all the 
renewed (new) shares once an update/renewal protocol is triggered. 
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1.3 Thesis Outline 
The Thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we discussed about the work 
related to secret sharing and proactive secret sharing; the first proposed Shamir’s secret sharing 
scheme, Ostrovsky and Yung who introduced the concept of proactive security, first proposed 
proactive secret sharing scheme by Herzberg et al. and Cachin et al.’s asynchronous  proactive 
secret sharing scheme. We discussed the protocols for share generation, secret reconstruction and 
share renewal (proactive secret sharing) processes. In the 3rd chapter, we mentioned our approach 
of proactive secret sharing; public and private share generation and authentication protocols. 
Then we discussed about master secret renewal protocol, strong verifiable secret sharing 
protocols which can be applied for the proposed scheme. Later in this chapter, we discussed 
about shares adding or revoking and changing the threshold protocols. We concluded the 4th 
chapter by discussing the open problems in our proposed scheme and future work. 
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     CHAPTER 2 
RELATED WORK 
2.1 Basic Schemes 
In this chapter, we briefly discussed share generation and secret reconstruction protocols 
of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. And in the later part of this chapter, we discussed about 
proactive secret sharing which addresses the problem that given sufficient time the adversary can 
gain information about the secret in long-lived systems. We discussed about proactive security 
which was first mentioned by Ostrovsky and Yung and then we discussed about the first 
Proactive Secret Sharing Scheme which was proposed by Herzberg and the first asynchronous 
model of proactive secret sharing scheme by Cachin et al. 
Secret sharing and its many variations form an important primitive in cryptography. It 
finds extensive use in key management, distributed storage system etc. The basic model for 
secret sharing distinguishes at least two protocols: (i) a share generation protocol in which the 
secret s is divided into n sub-shares and distributed by a dealer among n participants, and (ii) a 
secret reconstruction protocol in which the secret is recovered by pooling the shares of a 
qualified subset of the participants (at least t shares are required to reconstruct the secret s ). 
Basic schemes ([29], [6] for threshold secret sharing) solve the problem for the case that all 
players in the scheme are honest. 
Secret sharing has been classified based on the following types : 
(1). Cryptographic (the secrecy of the secret depends on the difficulty of solving certain number 
       theoretic hard problem) or Information theoretic ([29], [6]) (the secrecy of the secret is not 
      dependent on the hardness of any computational problem). 
(2). Threshold ([29], [6]) (for a fixed threshold t, any set of t + 1 parties can uniquely reconstruct 
10 
 
       the secret i.e. access structure is the set of all different combinations of t + 1 parties) or Non- 
      threshold [3] (generalization of threshold; Access structure may have sets of parties of  
      different size). 
(3). Static ([29], [6], [3]) (the shares of secret remain the same after the distribution) or 
      Proactive/Mobile ([10], [19], [25]) (the shares can be refreshed or redistributed without 
      changing the secret in order to maintain secrecy over long periods). 
 In this paper, we focused on Proactive/Mobile type of secret sharing. In a Secret sharing 
scheme, a dealer divides a secret into multiple shares and distributes it among shareholders in 
such a way that any authorized subset of shareholders can reconstruct the secret; but any 
unauthorized subset of shareholders gain no information about the time. 
Shamir’s original scheme doesn’t prevent malicious behavior of dishonest shareholders 
during secret reconstruction and also the secret is stored for a long period of time. We can 
overcome these limitations using Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS).                           
 Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) scheme address the problem that even if the shares can be 
exposed or lost over certain period of time due to byzantine faults, new set of shares can be 
generated for the same master secret. Using Share regeneration/renewal protocol in PSS, the 
servers can obtain new shares and the old shares can be discarded, rendering useless information 
to the shareholder by the collection of t or fewer than t shares from the shareholders. Even if 
some of the old shares might have been lost, Share recovery protocol helps in the generation of a 
full set of new shares.  
Proactive security was first suggested by Ostrovsky and Yung [25] and this concept was 
applied to the secret sharing schemes by Herzberg et al. [19]. Basically the idea is that, if the 
information stored by the servers in order to share a given secret stays the same for all lifetime of 
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the system, then an adversary can eventually break into a sufficient number of servers, to learn 
and destroy the secret. On the other hand, let the time is divided into periods. At the beginning of 
each period the information stored by the servers in a given time period changes, while the 
shared secret stays the same. Then the adversary probably does not have enough time to break 
into necessary number of servers. Moreover, the information he learns during the period t is 
useless during the period t + i, for i = 1, 2, .. .. So, he has to start a new attack from scratch 
during each time period.  
Proactive security refers to security and availability in the presence of a so-called mobile 
adversary. Herzberg et al. [19] have further specialized this notion to robust secret sharing 
schemes and have given a detailed efficient proactive secret sharing scheme. Consider the 
following problem: if the information stored by the players in order to share a given secret stays 
the same for a long period of time (e.g. the lifetime of the system), then an adversary may 
gradually break into a sufficient number of players, to learn and destroy the secret. A way to 
address this problem is to divide the time into periods. At the beginning of each period the 
information stored by the players in that period changes, while the shared secret stays the same. 
The system is set up in such a way that the adversary does not have enough time to break into a 
required set of players. Moreover, the information that the adversary learns during a particular 
period is useless during later periods. So, the adversary has less change to break into the system 
and learn the secret.  
Proactive security provides enhanced protection to long-lived secrets against a mobile 
adversary, i.e., the adversary which is allowed to potentially move among players over time with 
the limitation that it can only control some subset of players at a time unit. In fact, proactive 
security adds protection by “time diffusion”. Namely, all shares are periodically refreshed. This 
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renders useless the knowledge obtained by the mobile adversary in the past. Proactive systems 
also use robustness techniques to enhance availability by tolerating (detecting and correcting) 
malicious players. Moreover, it also allows recoveries of the previously corrupt players, by 
“removing” the adversary influence and restoring their (correct) information. This gives the 
system a self-healing nature. As a result, the system can tolerate a mobile adversary. 
2.1.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Schemes 
A secret sharing scheme divides a secret s into n shares by a dealer D and distributes 
them among n shareholders P = {P1,P2 …..,Pn} in such a way that at least t shares are required to 
reconstruct the secret and less than t shares gain no information about the secret. The (t, n) 
threshold secret sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [29] and Blakley [6] independently 
in 1979. A (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme allows any t or more than t shareholders to 
reconstruct the secret; while fewer than t shareholders can gain no information about the secret.   
This technique enables the construction of robust key management schemes for 
cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even when misfortunes destroy 
half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the remaining pieces [29]. 
In [22], Liu considers the following problem:  
Eleven scientists are working on a secret project. They wish to lock up the documents in a cabinet so that 
the cabinet can be opened if and only if six or more of the scientists are present. What is the smallest 
number of locks needed? What is the smallest number of keys to the locks each scientist must carry? 
It is not hard to show that the minimal solution uses 462 locks and 252 keys per scientist. 
These numbers are clearly impractical, and they become exponentially worse when the number 
of scientists increases. In this paper we generalize the problem to one in which the secret is some 
data s. Our goal is to divide s into n shares p1, . . . . . pn in such a way that: 
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(1). knowledge of any t or more shares makes the secret s easily computable; 
(2). knowledge of any t-1 or fewer shares leaves the secret s completely undetermined (in the 
      sense that all its possible values are equally likely). 
Such a scheme is called a (t, n) threshold scheme. 
Efficient threshold schemes can be very helpful in the management of cryptographic 
keys. In order to protect data we can encrypt it, but in order to protect the encryption key we 
need a different method (further encryptions change the problem rather than solve it). The most 
secure key management scheme keeps the key in a single, well-guarded location (a computer, a 
human brain, or a safe). This scheme is highly unreliable since a single misfortune (a computer 
breakdown, sudden death, or sabotage) can make the information inaccessible. An obvious 
solution is to store multiple copies of the key at different locations, but this increases the danger 
of security breaches (computer penetration, betrayal, or human errors). 
By using a (t, n) threshold scheme with n = 2t- 1 we get a very robust key management 
scheme: We can recover the original key even when [n/2] = t- 1 of the n pieces are destroyed, 
but our opponents cannot reconstruct the key even when security breaches expose [n/2] = t- 1 of 
the remaining t pieces. 
In other applications the tradeoff is not between secrecy and reliability, but between 
safety and convenience of use. Consider, for example, a company that digitally signs all its 
checks. If each executive is given a copy of the company's secret signature key, the system is 
convenient but easy to misuse. If the cooperation of all the company's executives is necessary in 
order to sign each check, the system is safe but inconvenient. The standard solution requires at 
least three signatures per check, and it is easy to implement with a (3, n) threshold scheme. Each 
executive is given a small magnetic card with one pi share, and the company's signature 
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generating device accepts any three of them in order to generate (and later destroy) a temporary 
copy of the actual signature key s. The device does not contain any secret information and thus it 
need not be protected against inspection. An unfaithful executive must have at least two 
accomplices in order to forge the company's signature in this scheme. 
Some of the useful properties of this (t, n) threshold scheme are: 
(1). The size of each piece does not exceed the size of the original data. 
(2). When t is kept fixed, shares can be dynamically added or deleted without affecting the other 
       shares. 
(3). It is easy to change the shares without changing the original secret s; all we need is a new 
       polynomial f(x) with the same free term. A frequent change of this type can greatly enhance 
       security since the shares exposed by security breaches cannot be accumulated unless all of 
      them are values of the same edition of the f(x) polynomial. 
(4). By using tuples of polynomial values as shares, we can get a hierarchical scheme in which  
       the number of shares needed to determine s depends on their importance. For example, if we  
       give the company's president three values of f(x), each vice-president two values of f(x), and  
       each executive one value of f(x), then a (3, n) threshold scheme enables checks to be signed  
       either by any three executives, or by any two executives one of whom is a vice-president, or  
      by the president alone. 
Consider a system comprising a set of n servers that hold shares of a secret and communicate 
through a network. At any time, a server is either correct or compromised. A compromised 
server might stop executing, deviate arbitrarily from its specified protocols (i.e., Byzantine 
failure), and/or disclose or change information stored locally. A compromised server can be 
recovered and become correct after the following actions are taken. 
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• Reset hardware and system configurations 
• Reload the code (thereby eliminating Trojan horses) 
• Reconstitute the state of each server (which might have been corrupted) 
• Obsolete any confidential information an attacker might have obtained from 
compromised servers. 
Given a time interval T , a server is considered correct during T if and only if that server is 
correct throughout interval T ; otherwise, the server is deemed compromised during T . 
In Shamir’s (t, n) threshold scheme, Share generation is based on (t-1)th degree polynomial 
and secret reconstruction is based on Lagrange interpolating polynomial of at least t private 
shares. 
Share Generation Protocol: 
Dealer D divides the secret s among n shareholders such that atleast t shares are required 
to reconstruct the secret. The share generation protocol is discussed in Figure 2.1. 
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The share generation protocol is as follows: 
        (i). Dealer creates a random polynomial f(x) of degree (t-1) and a constant term a0 where a0 
                is the secret s  in a finite field(which is known to all the shareholders and the dealer as 
             well).  
                            f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 +......... +at-1xt-1 
                                 where a1,a2,…..at-1  are random polynomials. 
       (ii). Dealer randomly selects n  distinct points (xi ≠ 0), calculates each share value and 
              distributes the share to each shareholder secretly. (share i (s) = (xi , f(xi)) , i = 1,2……,n). 
         xi  value is a known value. So for our convenience, we chose xi = i.  
                     Therefore, s1 = f(1), s2 = f(2)……, sn = f(n) and the secret s = f(0). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Share Generation Protocol 
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Secret Reconstruction Protocol: 
 
         
Any subset of t or more shares can be used to reconstruct the secret. Without loss of        
generosity, the subset is : f(1), f(2)….f(t). 
      (i). Lagrange interpolating formula is used to find the polynomial f(x), such that degree of 
           f(x)<t  and f(i) = share i(s) for i = 1,2,……,n. 
     (ii).The reconstructed secret must be f(0). 
       
      Given any t pairs of (i, f (i)) , with distinct i values, there is a unique polynomial f(x) of 
     degree t-1, passing through all these points. This polynomial can be effectively 
     computed from the pairs (i, f (i)) . 
 
     
Figure 2.2 Secret Reconstruction Protocol 
 
 
 
Lagrange’s interpolating formula 
The polynomial f(x) can be calculated using Lagrange’s interpolating formula as stated in 
Table 2.1. 
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 Table 2.1 Lagrange’s interpolating formula 
                  Li(x)                    F(x) 
 
             ∏ (x – xj ) 
                j≠i 
Li(x) =    ___________  
 
                ∏  (xi – xj ) 
                j≠i 
 
 
           t 
f(x) = ∑   f(i) * Li(x) 
         i=1 
 
where Li(x) is the Lagrange 
interpolating polynomial. 
 
 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is information theoretic secure and it satisfies the basic 
requirements of secret sharing scheme. This can be verified as: 
(1). With the knowledge of any subset of t or more shares, it is possible to reconstruct the 
      secret. 
(2). By knowing less than t shares, the secret cannot be predicted. 
During secret reconstruction phase, shareholders may present fake shares and thus the other 
honest shareholders get nothing but a faked secret. For the fair reconstruction of the secret, 
cheater detection and/or identification are very essential. However, Shamir’s original secret 
sharing scheme doesn’t prevent malicious behavior of dishonest shareholders. 
There are several papers on cheater detection and/or identification for secret sharing  
schemes ([1],[7]) which consider exactly t shares during secret reconstruction. Some other papers 
([5],[23]) proposed secret sharing scheme based on an error-correcting code in which faked 
shares can be treated as error codes to be detected and corrected based on coding technique. 
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There are other papers in which more than t shares are used during secret reconstruction phase, 
and the redundant shares can be used for cheater detection and/or identification ([18], [30]). 
2.1.2 Proactive Secret Sharing Scheme  
Proactive security provides a method for maintaining the overall security of a system, 
even when individual components are repeatedly broken into and controlled by an attacker. In 
particular it provides for automated recovery of the security of individual components, avoiding 
the use of expensive and inconvenient manual processes. Ostrovsky and Yung [25] introduced 
the concept of proactive security and showed how a large class of multi-party protocol problems 
can be solved in a proactive way, in a setting where secure communication channels are 
available. 
Proactive security for secret sharing was first suggested by Herzberg et al. [19] where 
they presented, among other things, a proactive polynomial secret sharing scheme. The proposed 
proactive polynomial secret sharing scheme in [19] uses the verifiable secret sharing scheme of 
[27]. Proactive security refers to security and availability in the presence of a mobile adversary. 
Herzberg et al. [19] further specialized this notion to robust secret sharing schemes and gave a 
detailed efficient proactive secret sharing scheme. “Robust” means that in any time period, the 
shareholders can reconstruct the secret value correctly. 
The secret value needs to be maintained for a long period of time. The life time is divided 
into time periods which are determined by the global clock. At the beginning of each time period 
the servers engage in an interactive update protocol. The update protocol will not reveal the 
value of the secret. At the end of the period the servers hold new shares of the secret. The update/ 
share renewal protocol relies on verifiable secret sharing (VSS) which allows shareholders who 
have renewed their shares to verify that all renewed shares are consistent. It is a common 
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expectation that once we have the concept of proactivity very often it is quite easy to add it on 
top of an existing distributed protocol as VSS, not withstanding many known VSS are not easy 
to adapt for proactive property. 
Secret sharing alone does not defend against mobile adversaries which attack, 
compromise, and control one server for a limited period before moving to another. Given enough 
time, a mobile adversary might compromise t servers, obtain t shares, and thus learn the secret. 
The defense here is share refreshing, whereby servers periodically create a new, independent 
secret sharing and then replace old shares with new ones. Because the new and old shares are 
independent, a mobile adversary cannot combine new shares with old shares in order to 
reconstruct the secret. 
Secret sharing with share refreshing is known as proactive secret sharing (PSS). PSS 
reduces the window of vulnerability during which an adversary might compromise more than t 
servers in order to learn the secret. Without share refreshing, the window of vulnerability is 
unbounded; with PSS, the window of vulnerability is shortened to the period between two 
consecutive executions of share refreshing. 
Prior work on PSS protocols assumes a synchronous system, which implies bounds are 
known for message delivery delays and processor execution speeds. Any assumption constitutes 
a vulnerability, and the assumption of a synchronous system is no exception. Denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks, in particular, might delay messages and/or consume processor cycles, thereby 
invalidating the defining assumptions for a synchronous system. 
This paper describes APSS, a PSS protocol for asynchronous systems in which message 
delivery delays and processor execution speeds do not have fixed bounds. We are eliminating an 
assumption and thus eliminate vulnerability. Besides implementing secret sharing, APSS can be 
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used for threshold cryptography, where servers store shares of a private key and perform 
cryptographic operations using these shares (without ever materializing the entire private key). 
Asynchronous Proactive Secret Sharing was ﬁrst described in Zhou [32] and Zhou et al. 
[33]. This paper [33] restructures the original protocol, presents extensions, and provides a more 
rigorous proof than the one given in Zhou [32]. A second proactive secret sharing protocol for 
asynchronous systems, developed independently, is described in Cachin et al. [9], where a formal 
model and proof are presented. This protocol differs from APSS in two signiﬁcant ways: 
(1). It employs a randomized multi-valued validated Byzantine agreement protocol Cachin et al. 
       [8] so that all correct servers will agree on the set of sub-sharings to use in generating a new  
      sharing for the secret. APSS eschews the agreement and instead generates multiple new  
       sharings, each with a different label. There is no need to generate only one new sharing, so  
      APSS avoids the need to run an agreement protocol.  
(2). It employs a bivariate polynomial to implement subsharing recovery. The scheme, which can  
       be retroﬁtted into APSS, circumvents the exponential explosion that the (l, l ) secret sharing 
       causes for APSS; the protocol of Cachin et al. [9] has polynomial-time communication and 
      message complexity. 
However, the solution in Cachin et al. [9] does not apply to refreshing shares of an RSA 
private key because of its use of bivariate polynomial—for RSA, φ(n), the modulus, is not 
known to servers. In contrast, APSS can be easily adapted: because of its use of (l, l ) secret 
sharing, APSS can use the (n, n) threshold RSA scheme and share-refreshing scheme outlined in 
Rabin [28]—these schemes do not require operations with modulus φ(n). 
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APSS Correctness Requirements: 
The objective of APSS is to provide a protocol for share refreshing so that the following 
properties hold. 
APSS Secrecy: An adversary learns nothing about secret s.  
APSS Integrity: At any time, with high probability, secret reconstruction returns s when it 
terminates.  
APSS Availability: If messages sent during an execution of secret reconstruction are delivered 
before a subsequent execution of share refreshing starts, then that execution of secret 
reconstruction terminates. 
APSS Progress: Execution of share refreshing terminates on all servers that are correct during 
that execution of share refreshing; at termination, correct servers have deleted old shares and any 
related information.  
These correctness requirements must hold in a given assumed system model and adversary 
model. 
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2.1.2.1 Ostrovsky and Yung 
As a way to cope up with network worms and viruses, the concept of proactive secret 
sharing was first introduced by Ostrovsky and Yung [25]. If an adversary infects a shareholder at 
a constant rate, shareholders are rebooted and restored to the current state at an equal rate. 
Hence, they assume that in any given time period, t < [n / 2] shareholders may be faulty. (Note 
that this threshold is better than the t < [n / 3] typically required for asynchronous schemes, and 
is possible only because the correctness of their protocol is based on the unrealistic synchrony 
assumption that servers that fail to respond within some fixed amount of time are faulty.) 
Shareholders protect their shares by triggering a renewal protocol to refresh their shares and 
generate new shares from the old shares (discards their old shares and continue to use the new 
shares in place of old shares). In [25], the update protocol is implemented via a generic secure 
multi-party computation protocol on the existing shares. These multi-party protocols ([4], [11], 
[27]) are general but inefficient. Some are implemented in terms of many instances of verifiable 
secret sharing. This seminal work is important because it was the first to demonstrate that 
proactive secret sharing is theoretically possible; however, the Ostrovsky and Yung scheme is 
infeasible in practice because performing nontrivial calculations using generic secure multi-party 
protocols is expensive. Furthermore, Ostrovsky and Yung assume that the network is 
synchronous, and that secure channels are uncompromised by past corruptions of the endpoints. 
Practical implementations of secure channels involve secret keys that would be exposed by a 
compromise of the endpoints, and hence it is unclear how to recover the node in that case, since 
the adversary now knows the node’s secret keys. Although they show that “recovery” of a 
machine’s state is possible in theory by having all of the other participants construct it via a 
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secure multi-party computation, it is unclear how one might perform recovery efficiently in 
practice. 
2.1.2.2 Herzberg et al. 
An effective way to protect the secret from adversary attacks is to periodically update the 
shares. Herzberg et al. [19] in 1995 developed Proactive Secret Sharing Scheme to the existing 
Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme. Their paper focuses mainly on constructing semantically 
secure and robust (at any time honest servers/shareholders should have correct shares and this 
correctness can be verified by other servers) secret sharing scheme. All these honest shareholders 
must co-operate with the other shareholders who do not have correct shares and help them in 
recovering their lost shares. The recovered shares must be kept secret except to the intended 
shareholder. 
Herzberg used the basic share generation and secret reconstruction protocols of original 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. After initialization of Shamir’s SSS, at the beginning of each 
time period, all the honest servers (shareholders) can trigger an update phase during which all the 
servers perform a share renewal protocol. During the share renewal process, all the shareholders 
(servers) should have access to a common global clock so that there will be process 
synchronization between all the servers and also all the servers can apply the renewal protocol at 
a certain period of time. Time is divided into multiple slots which is determined by the common 
global clock. Each server is connected to a communication broadcasting medium 
(communication channel) such that all the messages sent though this channel reaches every party 
connected to it. At the beginning of each time slot, servers trigger update protocol and at the end 
of the timeslot new shares will be generated. 
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Servers store shares that constitute a (t, n) secret sharing for s. The initial shares are 
generated by a trusted party and are assumed to have been delivered securely to all participating 
servers. Thereafter, servers replace old shares with new shares by periodically invoking share 
refreshing. Secret reconstruction is used to reassemble a secret from the shares when needed. 
Complications arise when executions of share refreshing is concurrent with secret 
reconstruction, because share refreshing might delete (old) shares that secret reconstruction 
needs. This is an instance of the well-known readers/writers problem [13], with secret 
reconstruction the reader and share refreshing the writer. One solution, in the spirit of Lamport’s 
[20] concurrent reading while writing, is to use version numbers in conjunction with verifiable 
secret sharing; execution of secret reconstruction detects whether shares it reads constitute a 
sharing of s and iterates if they do not. 
A secret sharing scheme is quite vulnerable when an adversary breaks into a system before 
the lifetime of the secret expires. Ben-Or et al. [4] in 1988 discussed on distributed fault 
tolerance systems and described some of the possible solutions to avoid these attacks. Among 
several different adversary attacks, some of the frequently prone attacks are: 
• Passive adversary attacks, and 
• Active adversary attacks 
Passive adversary attacks results in spoofing the data without actually modifying or 
correcting the data. In active adversary attacks, much in contrast with passive adversary attacks, 
the adversaries penetrate into the system, infiltrate the system, damage and/or destroy the data 
already existing in the system. Herzberg proposed PSS based on Shamir’s SSS to prevent these 
attacks.  
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An adversary can corrupt the shares at any time period. If an adversary corrupts the shares 
during an update phase, then it is believed that they are corrupted during both the adjacent time 
periods of the update phase. Herzberg assumed that at any time period, an adversary can attack at 
most k shares (where k less than n/2) which guarantees the existence of k+1 shareholders at each 
time period. Servers can be corrupted in many ways by an adversary like learning any 
information in the server, modifying the data, disconnecting it, changing the intended behavior of 
the server etc.  
One of the important requirements of Proactive secret sharing scheme is an authenticated 
broadcast channel and secure communication channels between the shareholders. The 
shareholders renew their shares without the involvement of the dealer. At the beginning of each 
time period and after initialization, when all the shareholders (servers) trigger an update phase, 
all the servers should perform the share renewal protocol. After triggering the share renewal 
protocol, each shareholder will obtain a new share on the new t-1 polynomial. The shareholders 
should agree on the new polynomial with same secret s without revealing the secret. 
Assumption : 
A secret s is divided into n shares and is distributed among n shareholders. For some t-1 
degree polynomial f(x) each shareholder (i) holds a share f(i) after initialization. 
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Share Renewal protocol 
  
      (i).  Each shareholder (i) where i ε [1,n] randomly picks t-1 numbers from the finite field. 
            These numbers define a polynomial p(x)  of degree t-1. 
      (ii).  Each shareholder(i) distributes the shares pi(x) among the shareholders using Verifiable 
            Secret Sharing Scheme. 
      (iii). Each shareholder(i)  receives all the shares p1(i), p2(i)……pn(i) and computes the new 
              shares by adding the sum of all new shares to his old share. The new share is computed 
            as follows: 
                                      k=n   
             h(i) = f(i) + ∑ pk(i)       
                                      k=1 
 
where h(i) is the new share of ith shareholder ; 
                    f(i) is the old share 
    
             Figure 2.3 Share Renewal Protocol 
 
 
 
In this way new shares can be computed; and after generation of new shares, the 
shareholders can discard their corresponding old shares. 
28 
 
There are protocols for share renewal protocols in the presence of active attackers, 
detection of corrupted shares, recovery of lost or corrupted shares which are defined in the 
original paper of Herzberg [19]. 
2.1.2.3 Cachin et al.’s Asynchronous Scheme 
 The protocol of Cachin, Kursawe, Lysyanskaya, and Strobl [9] is the first efficient 
scheme in the asynchronous model, also for t < [n/3]. Whereas the Herzberg et.al scheme [19] 
computes each new share P′(i) as a function of a corresponding old share P(i), the Cachin 
scheme is based on resharing the shares of the secret and combining the resulting sub-shares to 
form new shares of the secret. Their paper first presents a protocol for asynchronous verifiable 
secret sharing, then shows how to build an asynchronous proactive secret sharing scheme by 
having each honest shareholder create a VSS of its share. Their VSS scheme is similar to the one 
of Stinson and Wei [31], and the method of computing new shares from subshares is based on 
the linearity of Lagrange interpolation, which was proposed by Desmedt and Jajodia in [16]; 
however, the authors seem to be unaware of either of these earlier works. 
To handle share recovery for participants who have lost or never received their shares, 
Cachin et al. use a two-dimensional sharing in which shares are one-dimensional projections P(i, 
y) and P(x, i); thus, any participant can interpolate its share given the points of overlap with at 
least t+ 1 other shares. Cachin et al.’s protocol requires that a significant amount of information 
be broadcast by each participant to each other participant even in the absence of faults, whereas 
there are other schemes [19] achieves better efficiency in the common case by using a 
coordinator. Moreover, their protocol does not support changing the set of shareholders. 
  
 
29 
 
CHAPTER 3 
              OUR SCHEME 
For some secret sharing applications, the secret reconstructed is not revealed to the 
shareholders, therefore the secret/shares can be repeatedly used without having to be changed. 
But for other applications, in which the reconstructed secret is revealed to the shareholders, a 
new secret must be chosen and its corresponding shares must be regenerated and then secretly 
distributed to shareholders again. This is inefficient because of the overhead in the generation 
and distribution of shares. In [18], Harn et al. proposed a l-span secret sharing scheme for the 
general sharing policy to solve the share regeneration problem by extending the life span of the 
shares from 1 to l i.e., the shares can be repeatedly used for l number of times to generate l 
different secrets.  
This allows secrets to be shared in a more efficient way in which same set of shares can 
be used to reconstruct l different secrets. Even though this protocol allows the shares to be used 
for a longer period of time, the protection provided is insufficient as the secret is stored for 
longer period of time. Given sufficient time, an adversary might attack the system and gain 
sufficient knowledge about the secret. So to avoid this, we proposed a new Proactive secret 
sharing scheme, in which the secret is refreshed periodically at the beginning of each time slot 
without changing the private shares. In this way, private shares can be reused to generated 
different master secrets. 
In secret sharing scheme, the master secret and all the private shares (which are 
distributed by the dealer to the shareholders) are the two secrets which are to be maintained 
confidentially. In all the secret sharing schemes proposed till date, private shares are reused to 
reconstruct the master secret. But in our approach, instead of renewing the private shares 
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frequently at the beginning of each timeslot; during the share renewal process, each time master 
secret is renewed. In this way private shares can be reused for a longer period of time and also 
private shares can be reused to construct different master secrets. 
Certificate Authority (CA) is a server which issues digital certificates to be used by other 
parties. The digital certificate contains a public key and identity of the owner of the certificate. 
CA is very important in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) schemes. In such key management 
applications our scheme can be applied.  CA has a private key for generating digital signatures.   
Instead of storing the entire key secretly, it is better to divide the key into number of 
shares and share the key. This private key can be shared as a secret; and is shared in a secret 
sharing scheme. Once if all the private shares are able to recover the master secret, then the 
secret is no longer secure. So it is necessary to renew the master secret keeping all the private 
shares secure. If all the private shares are kept secure during secret reconstruction, dealer only 
needs to renew master secret but not the private shares. So in this way, the secret sharing scheme 
becomes even more efficient as the private shares can be reused for a longer period of time. 
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3.1 Motivation 
In a secret sharing scheme, a mutually trusted dealer determines the master secret and 
stores it in a centralized server. The dealer generates private shares and distributes them among n 
shareholders which are stored separately in n distributed servers. In all the existing Proactive 
Secret Sharing Schemes, it is believed that a mobile adversary can attack only the private shares 
but not the master secret, so at the beginning of each time period, new shares are generated 
leaving discarded all the old shares. In this paper, we followed a completely different approach 
where the master secret is renewed at the beginning of each time period.  Once if all the private 
shares are able to recover the master secret, then the secret is no longer secure. So it is necessary 
to renew the master secret keeping all the private shares secure. If all the private shares are kept 
secure during secret reconstruction, dealer only needs to renew master secret but not the private 
shares. So in this way, the secret sharing scheme becomes even more efficient as the private 
shares can be reused for a longer period of time. It is believed that the dealer is a trust worthy 
dealer and he divides the shares and distributes them to all the shareholders using a secured 
channel. When some of the old shares are compromised by an adversary, then without 
redistributing the remaining shares, the dealer (who has complete access privileges on the private 
shares) can revoke the compromised shares. Shares adding/revoking protocol for the proposed 
proactive secret sharing is mentioned in details in 3.6. However some changes are to be made to 
the master secret. An efficient way to change the threshold dynamically is mentioned in 3.7. In 
the proposed proactive secret sharing scheme, without redistributing the distributed private 
shares, the dealer can change the threshold of the master secret. 
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3.2 Contribution 
In the original Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, the dealer is believed to be trust worthy 
and hence it is believed that he distributes valid shares to the shareholders. In Shamir’s secret 
sharing scheme, a dishonest dealer might distribute inconsistent shares to the shareholders thus 
preventing them from recovering the secret. So, there is a need to check the consistency of the 
dealer. Feldam [17] and Pederson[26] introduced the concept of Verifiable secret sharing scheme 
to the original secret sharing scheme using which the shareholders can verify whether the dealer 
has sent them valid shares or not. Here, the dealer is not fully trusted; he may not reveal the 
secret but he can try attempting to share an invalid secret. In our proposal, we introduced a new 
notion of verifiable proactive secret sharing scheme which is called Strong Verifiable Proactive 
Secret Sharing Scheme (SVPSS). SVPSS ensures that all shares are strong t-consistent ( if in a 
set of n shares, any subset of t or more than t shares can recover the secret). 
In a (t , n)-SS scheme, let m ≥ t, a set of m shares s1, s2, . . . , sm are said to be consistent if 
any subset containing t shares of the set reconstructs the same secret. There are seven protocols 
which are defined under SVPSS. They are : the private shares generation protocol(3.3.2) , the 
public shares authentication protocol(3.3.4), the master secret generation/renewal 
protocol(3.4.2), the master secret reconstruction protocol(3.4.4), the strong verifiable secret 
sharing protocol(3.5.2), the shares addition/revoking protocol(3.6.1) and the changing threshold 
protocol(3.7.1).  All the above mentioned protocols are unconditionally secure. As the change is 
made only to the master secret, this unique feature simplifies the PSS as the change is to be made 
only to the central server (the master secret) without effecting all the private shares. Our 
proposed scheme reduces the overhead in restoring all the renewed shares once an 
update/renewal protocol is triggered. 
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3.3 Share Generation and Authentication 
3.3.1 Private Share Generation  
  Dealer divides the secret s into n shares and divides it among n shareholders in such a 
way that at least t (where t is the threshold value and the threshold value can be altered) shares 
are required to reconstruct the secret. The protocol for private share generation is designed as 
follows: 
 
3.3.2 Private Share Generation Protocol 
    
 
       (i).  Dealer selects a prime r where r > s; s being the secret. Dealer select a random private 
              share yi uε zr , for each shareholder Ui and sends the private share secretly to the dealer 
            (using a secure authenticated channel). 
       (ii). Dealer selects a random polynomial f 1(x) and makes this polynomial publicly known. 
      (iii).Each shareholder computes his own private share as yi = yi 
u + f 1(xi)  
               The polynomial f 1(x) is used for VSS. 
 
     
   Figure 3.1 Private Share Generation Protocol 
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3.3.3 Public Shares Authentication 
 After renewing each master secret on the centralized server, dealer needs to broadcast 
public shares of the renewed master secret to all shareholders. All shareholders can use their 
private shares to work together to authenticate the public shares of the master secret. 
 
 3.3.4 Public Shares Authentication Protocol  
  
             
           All shareholders follow the secret reconstruction protocol to invoke their private shares 
and public shares, ,
"
vy  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  to recover the constant term of Lagrange interpolation 
polynomial and compare this recovered value with the computed one-way hash value of  
).¦...¦¦( ' 1
'
2
'
1 +−= tnyyyhb   If these two values are identical, the public shares, ,
'
vy  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  
of the master secret s has been authenticated. 
 
    
   Figure 3.2 Public Shares Authentication Protocol 
 
 
 
Theorem The protocol can allow shareholders to authenticate the public shares, ,
/
vy  for 
,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  of the master secret. 
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Proof In the master secret generation protocol, only dealer can construct a polynomial with 
degree n exactly such that this polynomial passes through n private shares of shareholders and 
the specified constant term. Thus, after verifying the one-way hash value b generated by the 
dealer, all shareholders can be convinced that the input values of this one-way hash output is also 
generated by the dealer. 
3.4 Master Secret Generation/Renewal and Reconstruction 
 3.4.1 Master Secret Generation/Renewal 
Dealer need to construct a secret sharing scheme for the given master secret s in such a 
way that any t or more than t shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, but less than t shares 
gain no information about the secret. In this protocol, instead of renewing private shares 
periodically in a proactive secret sharing scheme, one can use the same private shares to 
reconstruct different master secrets. Thus, dealer needs to publish some public shares of each 
master secret.  This approach simplifies the implementation of PSS since secure channel for 
distributing private share to each shareholder is only needed during initialization.  By doing so, 
the efficiency of PSS can be improved as shares can be reused for long period of time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
3.4.2 Master Secret Generation/Renewal Protocol 
                 
 
         (i).   Let the threshold of the new master secret is t.   Dealer constructs a polynomial )(xf  
                 with degree n such that ,)( ii yxf = for ,,...,2,1 ni = and ,)0( 0 syf ==  where s is the master 
                 secret, x0=0 and xi is a publicly known parameter associated with each shareholder 
              
.iU  
        (ii). Dealer computes ,)(
''
vv yxf =  where ,
'
iv xx ∉  for .1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  Public shares 
              ,)(
''
vv yxf =  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  of the master secret s are made publicly known. 
        (iii).Dealer computes the one-way hash value of all public shares as  
                 ).¦...¦¦(
'
1
'
2
'
1 +−= tnyyyhb   Dealer repeats Step 2 to construct another polynomial f”(x) 
               With degree n  such that bf =)0("  and generate public shares, ,)("
"'
vv yxf =  for 
                 1,...,2,1 +−= tnv .  The public shares, ,)("
"'
vv yxf = for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  and the one-way hash 
               value b are made publicly known. 
 
 
   Figure 3.3 Master Secret Generation/Renewal Protocol 
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Remarks: 
(a) Dealer can use the Lagrange Interpolating formula to construct the polynomial )(xf  
      as 
.mod)(
,00
p
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xx
yxf
n
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j
n
i
i ∏∑
≠== −
−
=
  
(b) The polynomial )(xf is of degree n and the threshold value is t (i.e. nt ≤ ).  
     Therefore, dealer need to publish 1+− tn  public shares for secret reconstruction. 
(c) The one-way hash value b and the public shares ,)("
"'
vv yxf =  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  are  
      used to authenticate the public shares, ,)(
''
vv yxf =  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  of the master  
      secret. 
3.4.3 Master Secret Reconstruction 
Let the set of shareholders { 1iU , 2iU …, ti
U
} wants to recover the master secret s that is 
hidden in the constant term of the polynomial f(x).  According to the Lagrange interpolation 
formula, with knowledge of t private shares,
)(
iixf , for i=1,2,…t,  and n-t+1 public shares, ),(
'
vxf  
for i=1,2,…n-t+1,  the constant term of the interpolating polynomial is 
   
 
 
Table 3.1 Constant Term of the Interpolating Polynomial 
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Shareholders need to protect their private shares in order to reuse them in reconstructing multiple 
master secrets. The following protocol protects private shares unconditionally. 
 3.4.4 Master Secret Reconstruction Protocol 
      (i). Each shareholder iiU uses his private share
)(
iixf  on the secret polynomial, f(x), to 
            compute 
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      (ii).Each shareholder iiU  selects a random polynomial fi(x), with degree t-1, such that 
            ,)0( ii sf =  and computes ),( rii xf  for .,...,2,1 tr =  iiU  sends each  )( rii xf  to shareholder 
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       (iv). After revealing ,ry  for ,,...,2,1 tr =  a Lagrange interpolating polynomial with degree t-1 
             on these t-1 points can be constructed.  The constant term of the polynomial 
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Figure 3.4 Master Secret Reconstruction Protocol 
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Theorem:  The master secret reconstruction protocol protects private shares unconditionally. 
Proof:  In Step 2, each shareholder uses secret sharing scheme to divide his private share into t 
pieces and in Step 3, each shareholder uses additive homomorphism of linear polynomials to 
hide each piece of private share in the sum of shares of t  randomly selected polynomials.  By 
revealing the sum of shares, the security of each private share is unconditionally protected. 
3.5 Verifiable Secret Sharing 
In a (t, n) secret sharing scheme, consistency check should be performed on all the shares 
for fare reconstruction of the secret s. In [18], Lein et al. defined consistency in the following 
way: 
Let S be the domain of a secret s and T be the domain of shares corresponding to the 
secret. We say that the function FI : Tt → S is an induced function of the (t, n)-SS for each subset 
with |I| = t. This function defines the secret s as follows with any set of t shares si1, . . . , sit     
          s = F(I ) = FI (si1, . . . , sit ), where I = {i1, . . . , it }. 
Actually, the sharing secret s is computed from the polynomial f I (x) which is constructed 
by the interpolation of the points (i1, si1), . . . , (it , sit ). 
Definition (Consistency):  In a (t , n)-SS scheme, let m ≥ t, a set of m shares s1, s2, . . . , sm is said 
to be consistent if any subset containing t shares of the set reconstructs the same secret. 
Formally, let T = {T1, . . . , Tu} be the set of u elements where each element contains t shares of 
the set of m shares, where u = ( mt 
 ) denotes the total number of these subsets, then we have  
si = F(Ti ) = FTi (si1, . . . , sit ), where i = 1, . . . , u. 
s1, s2, . . . , sm are consistent which means that s1 = · · · =  su. Moreover, if s1, s2, . . . , sm 
are consistent, then the reconstructed secrets si for i = 1, . . . , u are all identical. 
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Remark:  In fact, since all shares are generated by a polynomial in Shamir’s (t, n)-SS scheme, to 
check whether m, where m ≥ t, shares are consistent or not, we only need to check whether the 
interpolation of m points (1, s1), . . . , (m, sm) yields a polynomial with degree t − 1 or not. If this 
condition is satisfied, we can conclude that all secrets si for i = 1, . . . , u are identical and all 
shares are consistent. This approach to check shares consistency only requires one computation 
instead of u combinations of t out of m shares. In VSS, all shareholders work together to perform 
this consistency check to verify if the dealer has shared correct shares or not. 
The concept of VSS was first introduced by Chor et al.[12] in 1985. In verifiable secret 
sharing (VSS) the object is to resist malicious players as discussed in [12], such as 
(1). a dealer sending incorrect shares to some or all of the participants, and 
(2). participants submitting incorrect shares during the reconstruction protocol 
The verifiability is an important property in secret sharing scheme; as all the shareholders 
work together to verify that all shares are t-consistent without revealing the shares or the secret. 
If any subset of t out of n shares can produce the same secret, then the shares are said to satisfy 
the property of t-consistency. Benaloh [2] introduced the notation of t-consistency to determine 
whether a secret sharing is verifiable or not. In secret sharing scheme, all the shareholders trust 
the dealer that their shares are consistent. There are two aspects of the security in a VSS. One is 
the security of the secret and the other is the security of the verification. Verifiable Secret 
Sharing (VSS) schemes guarantee the robustness of the sharing and the detection of corrupt 
players.  
Normal definition of VSS is as follows : 
Suppose there is a dealer D and participants P1, . . . , Pn connected by private channels. 
They also have access to broadcast channel. There is a static adversary A, that can corrupt a set 
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of the participants from  ∆A including the dealer D. Here static means that the participants 
controlled by the adversary are fixed. 
 Let π be a protocol, consisting of two phases: Share and Reconstruct. 
• At the beginning of the Share the Dealer inputs a secret s Є K. 
• At the end of Share each participant Pi is instructed to output a Boolean value veri. 
• At the end of Reconstruct each participant is instructed to output a value in K. 
The first unconditionally secure proactive VSS was proposed by Stinson and Wei [31]. A 
generalization of this scheme to general access structures has later been given in [24]. Recently 
D’Arco and Stinson ([14], [15]) showed that some existing unconditionally secure proactive 
schemes [30, 15] can be broken. 
An unconditionally secure VSS, can be defined as follows: 
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The protocol π is unconditionally secure Verifiable Secret Sharing protocol if the following 
properties hold: 
       (i).   If a good player Pi outputs veri = 0 at the end of Share then every good player outputs  
             veri= 0; 
      (ii).  If the dealer D is good, then veri = 1 for every good Pi; 
       (iii). If a group of good players Pi output veri = 1 at the end of Share, then there exists an 
               s’ЄK such that the event that all good Pi output’s at the end of Reconstruct is fixed at 
             the end of Share and s’ = s if the dealer is good; 
       (iv). If |K| = q and s is chosen randomly from K, and the dealer is good, then any forbidden 
               coalition cannot guess at the end of Share the value s with probability better than 1/q. 
 
    
Figure 3.5 Unconditionally Secure VSS Protocol 
 
 
 
If the dealer is malicious and deals with inconsistent shares among the shareholders, then 
the shares can no longer derive the secret from such inconsistent shares. So, Verifiable secret 
sharing scheme allows the shareholders to check whether shares are consistent or not. Feldman 
and Pederson VSS are based on hard to invert the homomorphism functions, and in particular on 
the hardness of computing discreet logarithms over Zp  for the prime p. Feldman’s [17] VSS is 
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based on computational assumptions in protecting secrecy of the secret; while Pederson’s [26] 
scheme is based on theoretical assumption of protecting the secrecy of the secret. Feldman’s [17] 
and Pedersen’s [26] schemes have similar efficiency but slightly different security guarantees. 
Feldman’s [17] scheme is perfectly binding (i.e., an un-trusted dealer cannot fool shareholders 
into accepting an invalid sharing) and computationally binding (meaning that secrecy is subject 
to computational hardness assumptions and the amount of computation available to the 
shareholders). Pedersen’s [26] scheme, on the other hand, is computationally binding and 
perfectly hiding. We focus on Feldman’s [17] scheme because it is notationally easier to describe 
than Pedersen’s [26] scheme; however, the systems we describe could be adapted to either 
scheme. We discussed Feldman and Benaloh’s scheme below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Feldman Scheme : 
            
(i) .Let p=mq+1 ( where p,q are primes and m is an integer).  Let g be an element of Zp  of 
           order q. The dealer chooses a polynomial f  over Zq with co-efficients f0, f1,…., fk and 
             broadcasts the values gf0, gf1, …., gfk . the it secretly transmits the value xi = f(i)(mod q) 
             to Pi. Each shareholder(server) checks its own share by verifying the following equation 
           gxi = (gf0)(gf1)i(gf2)i2…..(gfk)ik(mod p) 
        (ii).If the equation holds good, then each shareholder (Pi) broadcasts its message accepting 
              as proper. If all the shareholders find their shares as correct; then it is believed that the 
            dealer honestly shared consistent shares to the shareholders.  
      (iii). By the homomorphic properties of the exponential function( ga+b = gagb), the above 
              equation holds good for all i ε {1….n} if and only if the shares were dealt correctly. gxi 
                  is not only used to verify the correct dealing of shares but also to check the consistency 
            of shares during secret reconstruction. 
 
    Figure 3.6 Feldman VSS Scheme 
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Benaloh’s Scheme : 
In Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme, all the shares are t-consistent if and only if the 
interpolation of the points (1, s1), (2, s2)….(n, sn) yields a polynomial of degree at most t-1.  
Benaloh’s protocol allows the shareholders to perform the required validation while verifying the 
dealers  authenticity and integration. The (t, n) VSS proposed by Benaloh can only ensure that all 
shares are t-consistent; but shares may not satisfy the security requirements of a (t ,n) secret 
sharing scheme. 
  
Proof: 
       (i).  As in the secret sharing scheme, the dealer choses a random polynomial P and 
             distributes its shares among the shareholders. 
       (ii).Dealer constructs a very large polynomial P1, P2….Pk of degree t and distributes it 
             shares.  
       (iii).Shareholders choose a random set of polynomials (m<k). 
       (iv).Dealer reveals shares of the m chosen polynomials Pi1,…,Pim and sums of 
             remaining k-m sums P + ∑ kj=m+1 Pj then shares the result as well. 
        (v). Each share-holder or verifier ascertains that all revealed polynomials are degree-t, and 
             corresponds to its own known share. 
  Throughout this process, the secret s remains safe and unexposed. 
 
                      Figure 3.7 Benaloh’s Scheme 
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3.5.1 Strong Verifiable Secret Sharing 
Without revealing the actual secret and the corresponding shares, all shareholders need to 
work together to determine that any subset of t shares are able to recover the same secret. A 
verifiable secret sharing scheme allows the users to check for the consistency of shares by 
working together.  
Benaloh proposed that shares in Shamir's secret sharing scheme are t-consistent if and 
only if the interpolation of n shares yields a polynomial of degree at most t-1. This implies that if 
the interpolating polynomial of n shares is with degree at most t-1, then all shares are t-
consistent. However, the property of t-consistency does not guarantee that all shares satisfy the 
security requirements of a secret sharing scheme as pointed out in [21]. For example, if the 
interpolating polynomial of n shares is with degree t-2, then all shares are both (t-1)-consistent 
and t-consistent. The polynomial with degree t-2 can be reconstructed with only t-1 (which is 
less than the threshold t) shares. This condition violates the security requirement of a secret 
sharing scheme, i.e., at least t shares are needed to reconstruct the secret. Therefore, a new notion 
of strong t-consistency is presented below.  
Strong t-consistency- A set of shares are said to be strong t-consistent, if in a set of  n shares, any 
subset containing  t or more than t  shares reconstruct the same secret (i.e. tn ≥ ). 
Shares in Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] are strong t-consistent if and only if the 
interpolation of n shares yields a polynomial of degree t-1 exactly.  It is obvious that if all shares 
in Shamir's secret sharing scheme are generated by a polynomial with degree exactly t-1 , then 
(a) all shares are t-consistent, and (b) all shares satisfy the security requirements of a secret 
sharing scheme.   
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According to the security requirements of secret sharing scheme, at least t shares are 
needed to reconstruct the secret.  If there are more than t shares presented, strong t-consistency 
check can be performed by constructing a Lagrange interpolation polynomial of these shares.  If 
the interpolating polynomial has degree exactly t-1, shares are strong t-consistent. In this paper,  
Strong Verifiable Secret Sharing (SVSS) protocol has been proposed that allows all shareholders 
to verify that their shares are strong t-consistent.   
3.5.2 Strong Verifiable Secret Sharing Protocol  
Verifiable secret sharing is needed whenever the master secret has been renewed or 
shares have been added/ revoked.  Shareholders have to verify their private shares after the 
modification; and check whether they are strong (n+1)-consistent without revealing their 
corresponding private shares and the master secret.   
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SVSS Protocol 
  
      (i). Each shareholder Ui selects a random polynomial fi(x) with degree exactly equal to n, 
             and computes fi(xr), for r=1,2,….,n and ),( 'vi xf for v=1,2,…..,n-t+1. Ui sends each fi(xr) to 
           shareholder Ur secretly, for r=1,2,……,n and ,ir ≠  and publishes ),( 'vi xf  for 
           .1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  
      (ii). After receiving )( 'vr xf  and )( ir xf , for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv and ,,...,2,1 nr =  each 
            shareholder iU uses his private share iy  of the polynomial )(xf to compute 
            ,mod)()(
1
pxfxfz r
n
r
rii ∑
=
+=  and make this value publicly known.  Also, each 
            Shareholder computes ,mod)()( '
1
' pxfxfz v
n
r
rvv ∑
=
+=  for .1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  
      (iii). After revealing ,iz  for ,,...,2,1 nr =  and ,vz  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv  a Lagrange 
                interpolating polynomial of these 12 +− tn  points, iz  and vz , can be constructed.  If 
              this polynomial has degree n exactly, shareholders are convinced that their private 
      
              shares are strong n-consistent.  
 
    Figure 3.8 Strong Verifiable Secret Sharing Protocol 
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A SVSS protocol can guarantee that all shares are strong n-consistent without revealing 
private shares and the secret.  In Step 1, each shareholder selects a random polynomial with 
degree n.  In Step 2, each shareholder use additive homomorphism of linear polynomial to hide 
his private share in the sum of his private share and the sum of shares of n random polynomials. 
By revealing this sum, the security of each private share is unconditionally protected.   In Step 3, 
if the interpolating polynomial has degree n exactly, the degree of polynomial f(x) is at most n. 
This is because the interpolating polynomial is pxfxf
n
r
r mod)()(
1
∑
=
+  and each shareholder 
iU has contributed one polynomial )(xf i  with degree n exactly in .mod)(
1
pxf
n
r
r∑
=
 Since 
)(')( " iii xfyxf +=  and )(' xf  is a polynomial with degree n exactly, shareholders can further 
conclude that the polynomial f(x) is with degree n exactly.  Thus, all shares are strong n-
consistent. 
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3.6 Shares Adding/Revoking Protocol 
When dealer wants to assign new shares to new shareholders, dealer can just select new 
points on the polynomial f(x) of the master secret.  After this modification, all shareholders need 
to work together to verify that their shares are strong (n+1)-consistent.  This is because new 
shares have been added and shareholders want to verify whether these new shares are consistent 
with the existing shares.   
When dealer wants to revoke old shares, dealer needs to invoke the master secret renewal 
protocol in Section 3.4. In this protocol, dealer need to construct a new polynomial.  This new 
polynomial will pass through all remaining shares and the old master secret except the revoked 
shares.  Dealer computes the public shares of the renewed master secret and makes these public 
shares publicly known.  After revoking old shares, shareholders need to verify whether these 
remaining shares are consistent since a new polynomial and new public shares are generated. 
In both situations, shareholder’s shares have not been changed.  No private channel is 
needed to distribute private share to each shareholder.   
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3.7 Changing Threshold Protocol 
Dealer divides the secret s into n shares and divides it among n shareholders in such a 
way that at least t (where t is the threshold value and the threshold value can be altered) shares 
are required to reconstruct the secret where as less than t shares gain no information about the 
secret. Dealer can either increase or decrease the threshold t of the master secret s. Whenever 
dealer decide to change the threshold of the master secret, our proposed PSS allows dealer to 
accomplish the task without changing private shares. This provides an efficient way to change 
threshold dynamically. 
 
3.7.1 Decreasing the Threshold 
When dealer want to reduce the threshold without changing the old master secret, dealer 
just need to publish additional public shares.   
 
 3.7.2 Increasing the Threshold 
On the other hand, when dealer want to increase old threshold to a new threshold t’ 
without changing the old master secret, the dealer can select a polynomial g(x) with degree 
[n+(t’-t)] exactly and 0)0( =g .  Dealer publishes this polynomial g(x).  Dealer can employ the 
public shares authentication protocol in Section 3.3.3 to enable all shareholders to authenticate 
this public polynomial. Each shareholder iU updates his new share value by himself as 
).()( ii xgxf +   Also, public shares of the master secret should be updated as  
),()()( '''' vvvv xgyxgxf +=+  for ,1,...,2,1 +−= tnv   
 
52 
 
 3.7.3 Strong t-consistency Check  
Strong t-consistency check does not need for both situations.  Under the situation to 
decrease the threshold, since the polynomial and the shares are unchanged, shares must be strong 
(n+1)-consistent as before.  Under the situation to increase the threshold, since the new share is 
the sum of share of )(xf  and the share of )(xg  which is a public polynomial with degree [n+(t’-
t)], the new shares must be strong [n+(t’-t)+1]-consistent if the shares of )(xf  are strong (n+1)-
consistent. 
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CHAPTER 4 
                     CONCLUSION 
In secret sharing scheme, the master secret and all the private shares (which are 
distributed by the dealer to the shareholders) are the two secrets which are to be maintained 
confidentially. In all the proactive secret sharing schemes proposed till date, private shares are 
reused to reconstruct the master secret. But in our approach, instead of renewing the private 
shares frequently at the beginning of each timeslot during the share renewal process, each time 
master secret is renewed.  
All the existing Proactive secret sharing schemes assume that an adversary can attack 
only the shares but not the master secret. Therefore, shares are renewed at the begin of each time 
period. In our proposal, we considered a complete different approach of Proactive secret sharing 
in which the master secret is to be renewed frequently but not the private shares. After each 
renewing process, private shares remain the same and can be reused for reconstructing different 
master secrets.  In addition, after each renewing process, shareholders can work together to 
verify that their private shares are consistent without revealing private shares. If once the 
shareholders are able to reconstruct the master secret, then the secret is no longer secure. So if all 
the shares are kept secure during the secret reconstruct, then the dealer needs to renew only the 
master secret.  By adopting the proposed solution, implementation of secret sharing makes 
proactive secret sharing even more practical and flexible.  
There are several properties like Asynchrony, Efficiency, Threshold adaptivity which are 
to be satisfied by proactive secret sharing schemes to be useful in real systems. We mentioned 
our approach of proactive secret sharing; public and private share generation and authentication 
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protocols. Then we discussed about Master secret renewal protocol, strong verifiable secret 
sharing protocols which can be applied for the proposed scheme.  
4.1 Open Problems and Future Work 
Proactive secret sharing scheme can be used in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) schemes 
where Certificate Authority (CA) is used to generate digital signatures. The digital certificate 
contains a public key, digital signature and identity of the owner of the certificate. In such key 
management applications our scheme can be applied.  CA has a private key for generating digital 
signatures. Instead of storing the entire key secretly, it is better to divide the key into number of 
shares and share the key. This private key can be stored as a secret; and is shared in a secret 
sharing scheme. Once if all the private shares are able to recover the master secret, then the 
secret is no longer secure. So it is necessary to renew the master secret keeping all the private 
shares secure. If all the private shares are kept secure during secret reconstruction, dealer only 
needs to renew master secret but not the private shares. So in this way, the secret sharing scheme 
becomes even more efficient as the private shares can be reused for a longer period of time. 
If once the share holders are able to recover the master secret, then the secret is no longer 
secure. So it is necessary to refresh both the shares and secret at the same time. The future work 
could be to incorporate both secret and share refreshment together in a complete key 
management systems.    
One of the limitations of proactive secret scheme is that they assume the set of share 
holders remain same forever. The proactive secret sharing scheme could further be extended in 
adding and deleting shareholders while sharing the same secret. 
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